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NEGOTIATING COMPETITION POLICY IN
MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS:
EUROPEAN UNION OVERTURES
TO WEST AFRICA AND THE WTO

PAUL KURUK *

INTRODUCTION
Competition Policy 1 has been proposed by the European Union
(EU) as a subject-matter for inclusion in the Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPA) that the EU is currently negotiating with the
African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. 2 An
agreement in the EPAs covering competition would include not
only the traditional prohibitions against agreements and practices
in restraint of competition and monopolies and regulation of
mergers, 3 but also, as proposed by the EU, it would incorporate
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1
Competition policy refers to the legislative framework or to the set of
regulations which control practices by both private and public firms which are
deemed to restrict competition in the market. SOUTH CTR., COMPETITION POLICY IN
ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS (CARIFORUM TEXT): FACT SHEET NO. 8, ¶ 4
(2008) [hereinafter SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 8].
2
The European Union is negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPAs) with 75 of its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
(ACP). SOUTH CTR., UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS
(EPAS): FACT SHEET NO. 1, ¶ 1 (2007) [hereinafter SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 1].
The EPAs are essentially free trade agreements (FTA) that envisage the creation of
a free trade area between the EU and ACP countries. Id. A free trade refers to a
group of countries that have eliminated tariff and most non-tariff barriers
affecting trade among themselves, while each participating country applies its
own independent schedule of tariffs to imports from countries that are not
members. See generally id.
3 A basic competition law framework typically includes the following:
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core principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO), such as
transparency, non-discrimination, and procedural fairness. 4
Governments throughout the world have designed and
implemented competition policies as fundamental instruments in
the promotion of more transparent, more efficient, and more open
markets as well as the promotion of consumer protection and
welfare. 5 There is the expectation that effective competition in the
market place would result in the most effective use of national
resources, provide incentives for innovation and enable consumers
to benefit from lower prices, better quality and a variety of goods
and services. 6 In this context, therefore, competition policy can
contribute to economic growth and thereby complement
government policies aimed at poverty reduction. 7
However, despite the proliferation of national competition
rules, 8 there are no legally binding international disciplines on
competition policy.
Developing countries have vigorously
opposed initiatives to create such frameworks fearing potential
restrictions on their policy space to adopt appropriate strategies for
development. 9 The small and vulnerable economies have also
[i] [t]he prohibition of cartels or agreements among rival firms to stop
competing by fixing prices, allocating or sharing markets and fighting
outsiders (non members of the cartel); [ii] [t]he control of vertical anticompetitive practices and the prohibition of abuses of dominant market
power by large firms or monopolies; [and] [iii] [t]he control and review
of mergers and acquisitions which may lead to the creation of a
dominant player in the market . . . .
SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 8, supra note 1, ¶ 425. A document prepared by the
World Trade Organization lists the national laws on competition in force in more
than 50 countries. See Overview of Members’ National Competition Legislation, infra
note 8, at 3–18.
4 See infra notes 74–93 and accompanying text.
5 SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 8, supra note 1, ¶ 5.
6 John Preston, Implementing Competition Policy in Developing Countries: The
Role
of
Donors,
at
3
(Dec.
1,
2005),
available
at
http://www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/80/Session3.4PrestonDoc.
pdf.
7 Id. at 3.
8 For an outline of national competition laws, see Working Group on the
Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, Note by the Secretariat:
Overview of Members’ National Competition Legislation, WT/WGTCP/W/128/Rev.3
(Nov. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Overview of Members’ National Competition Legislation],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/wgtcp_docs.e.htm.
9 Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy,
Background Note by the Secretariat: Core Principles, Including Transparency, NonDiscrimination and Procedural Fairness, WT/WGTCP/W/209, ¶ 31 (Sept. 19, 2002).
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been concerned about the challenges the proposed disciplines
would create, particularly regarding the heavy costs of
implementing and enforcing them. 10 This Article examines the
debate on international competition policy in the context of the
negotiations of the EPA between the EU and West Africa.
Section One of the Article identifies as background
information, the basic goals of competition policy. Section Two
traces how the subject of competition was introduced in
international trade negotiations while Section Three discusses the
implications of a multilateral agreement on competition policy
proposed by the EU in the WTO and based on principles of
transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness. A
description in Section Four of the discussions on competition
policy in the context of the EPA negotiations with West Africa is
followed in Section Five with an examination of alternative
regional schemes with special reference to the ECOWAS
Supplementary Act on Competition Rules.
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON COMPETITION
POLICY
1.1.

The Goals of Competition Policy

The most basic goals of competition policy are to promote and
maintain healthy inter-firm rivalry in markets 11 by regulating anticompetitive market structures and enterprise activities that impede
circulation 12 and also promote consumer welfare by regulating
practices or structures that could have a detrimental impact on the
See also Martin Khor, Analysis of the Doha Negotiations and the Functioning of the
World Trade Organization 16 (South Ctr., Research Paper No. 30, May 2010)
(observing that “[i]n December 2003, several leading developing countries
proposed to the WTO . . . that . . . the three issues of investment, competition, and
government procurement . . . be dropped from the Doha agenda”).
10
Martin Khor, The “Singapore Issues” in the WTO: Implications and Recent
Developments, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (2004), at 5, available at
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01284/_res/id=s
a_File1/.
11 See generally MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2004).
12 Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy,
Background Note by the Secretariat: The Fundamental Principles of Competition Policy,
WT/WGTCP/W/127, at 5 (June 7, 1999) [hereinafter Fundamental Principles].
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prices charged to and/or the array of choices available to
consumers. 13 A third major goal aims at the promotion of
economic efficiency 14 in the sense of allocative efficiency, 15
productive efficiency or dynamic efficiency. 16
Other secondary goals reflected in varying degrees in some
competition laws and policies include the promotion of equity and
fairness, the promotion of opportunities for small and mediumsized businesses, market integration, promotion of technological
development, local production and employment, and the
protection of economic and political pluralism. 17
By advancing these objectives, competition policy would
contribute to the overall process of economic development and
poverty alleviation. For example, this could result from promoting
an efficient allocation of resources, 18 protecting the welfare of
consumers, 19 preventing or addressing excessive concentration
levels and resulting structural rigidities, 20 and addressing anticompetitive practices of enterprises that have a trade dimension. 21
Economic development would also be enhanced under
competition policy by increasing the economy’s ability to attract
foreign investment and to maximize the benefits of such
Id.
Id. ¶ 18.
15
See WTO, Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and
Competition Policy, Note by the Secretariat: Study on Issues Relating to a Possible
Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/228, ¶¶ 16–18 (May
19, 2003) (Part I) (discussing the different types of efficiency and defining
allocative efficiency). “’Allocative efficiency’ is achieved when society’s scarce
resources are allocated to produce the goods and services that are most desired by
consumers. This requires that price be equal to the marginal costs of production
and distribution from the social point of view.” Fundamental Principles, supra note
12, ¶ 11.
16 “’Productive efficiency’ is achieved when goods are produced using the
most cost-effective combination of productive resources available under existing
technology. ‘Dynamic efficiency’ is achieved through an optimal rate of
invention, development, and diffusion of new products and production
processes.” Fundamental Principles, supra note 12, ¶ 17 (citation omitted).
17 Id. ¶ 20.
18
See generally Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and
Competition Policy, Note by the Secretariat: Synthesis Paper on the Relationship of
Trade and Competition Policy to Development and Economic Growth,
WT/WGTCP/W/80, ¶ 9 (Sept. 18, 1998). See generally Fundamental Principles,
supra note 12, ¶ 19.
19 Id. ¶ 9.
20 Id. ¶ 11.
21 Id. ¶ 12.
13
14

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/1

KURUK (DO NOT DELETE)

NEGOTIATING COMPETITION POLICY

2015]

5/8/2015 6:24 PM

655

investment, 22 reinforcing the benefits of privatization and
regulatory reform or deregulation initiatives, 23 and establishing an
institutional focal point for the advocacy of pro-competitive policy
reforms and a competition culture. 24
Given the potential welfare benefits of competition policy, it is
not surprising that competition rules have mushroomed and are
now a staple of the business laws in many jurisdictions. 25
Provisions on competition can also be found in numerous bilateral
agreements and regional free trade agreements. 26 However, the
goal of the international community to develop a global instrument
has proved to be elusive, as described in the next section.
2. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON COMPETITION
POLICY: FROM HAVANA TO CANCUN
2.1.

The Havana Charter

The earliest major multilateral trade instrument to contain
references to competition policy was the Havana Charter signed in
March 1948 by some fifty-three countries setting up the
International Trade Organization (ITO). 27 During negotiations on
Id. ¶¶ 18–20.
Id. ¶¶ 1–26.
24 Id. ¶ 27.
25 Overview of Members’ National Competition Legislation, supra note 8.
26
See e.g., UNCTAD, COMPETITION PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS: HOW TO ASSURE DEVELOPMENT GAINS (Philippe Brusick et al. eds.,
2005), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditcclp20051_en.pdf (analyzing
provisions found in different types of RTAs, and making a number of policy
recommendations and identifying institutional arrangements needed to promote
synergies between trade and competition at the regional level); Sanoussi Bilal,
Trade and Competition Policy: Perspectives for Developing Countries 7 (2001), available
at
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publicationsopinion-files/4709.pdf (reviewing the current debate on competition policy,
analyzing the implementation and enforcement capacity of developing countries,
and assessing the relevance of a global competition policy framework for
developing countries).
27
The Havana Charter incorporated special provisions to enhance the
contribution of investment to economic development. For example, Article 12 of
the Havana Charter captioned “International Investment for Economic
Development and Reconstruction” provided that “international investment, both
public and private, can be of great value in promoting economic development and
reconstruction, and consequent social progress,” and that “the international flow
of capital will be stimulated to the extent that Members afford nationals of other
22
23
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the Havana Charter, the United States had argued for a
“multilateral code focussed on protecting foreign investment from
discrimination and nationalization by host countries.” 28 However,
many of the developing countries – the majority of them now
classified as developed countries 29 – opposed this, fearing their
sovereignty would be compromised under the proposed code.
In the end, the Havana Charter provided for the right of each
member to “determine whether and to what extent and upon what
terms it will allow future foreign investment” 30 and to “take any
appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure that foreign investment
is not used as a basis for interference in [a country’s] internal
affairs.” 31 It also recognized the right of Member States to take
action by statute or decree to prevent restrictive business practices
including monopolies or restraints of trade. 32 Significantly, the
Havana Charter did not prohibit discrimination against foreign
direct investment, merely requiring that States “give due regard to
countries opportunities for investment and security for existing and future
investments.” Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization art. 12,
Mar. 24, 1948, in U.N. Conference on Trade & Employment, Final Act and Related
Documents 8–9, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 [hereinafter Havana Charter], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf.
28 Riyaz Dattu, A Journey from Havana to Paris: The Fifty-Year Quest for the
Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 275, 287, 291–92
(2000).
29 As one author explains,
by this time, the hitherto great world powers such as the United
Kingdom, France and Germany had ceased to be capital exporting
countries and were faced with an upsurge in American foreign
investment after the war. They therefore had to erect, or leave space for,
formal and informal mechanisms to ensure that their national interests
were protected. During this time the formal mechanisms that these
countries used included foreign exchange controls and regulations
against foreign investment in sensitive sectors, such as defense and
cultural industries. Informally, they used mechanisms such as ‘takeover
restrictions, undertakings and voluntary restrictions by transnational
corporations in order to restrict foreign investment and impose
performance requirements.’
Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral
Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?, 26 NW.
J. INT.’L & BUS. 95, 109 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
30 Havana Charter, supra note 27, art. 12(1)(c)(iii).
31 Id. arts. 12(1)(c)(ii), 12(1)(c)(i).
32
Article 52, entitled “Domestic Measures against Restrictive Business
Practices,” provides that “[n]o act or omission to act on the part of the
Organization shall preclude any Member from enforcing any national statute or
decree directed towards preventing monopoly or restraint of trade.” Id. art. 52.
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the desirability of avoiding discrimination as between foreign
investments.” 33 There was also no obligation for national
treatment or right of establishment in the ITO provisions, and
neither did the provisions cover investment incentives or
performance requirements. 34
However, the provisions on competition in the Havana
Charter, limited as they were, never entered into force. Other parts
of the Charter, including provisions that envisaged strong
enforcement powers for the ITO, had raised concerns in the US,
and the United States Congress rejected the Charter. 35 Without
American support, the ITO was doomed 36 and the Havana Charter
that sought to create it never came into effect except for the trade
provisions of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which were
applied on a provisional basis until the establishment in 1994 of the
WTO. 37
2.2.

UNCTAD’s Work Program

Under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, the international community engaged in
protracted negotiations during the 1970s and 1980s on a Code of
Conduct for Transnational Corporations (TNCs). 38
The
formulation of such a code 39 was part of a plan to establish a New
Id. art. 12, ¶ 2(a)(ii).
EDWARD M. GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
101 (1996).
35 Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jisun Kim, International Competition Policy and the
INST.
FOR
INT’L
ECON.
(2008),
available
at
WTO,
PETERSON
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=930.
36
PAUL B. STEPHAN, DON WALLACE, JR. & JULIE A. ROIN, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND POLICY 74 (2d ed. 1996), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=930.
37
LUISA E. BERNAL ET AL., THE DOHA TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND LOCAL
COMMUNITIES: THE INVESTMENT AGENDA AND THE SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS IN THE
WTO, ¶ 22 (2003).
38 UNCTC Origins, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
[UNCTAD], http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/UNCTCOrigins.aspx (last visited
Mar. 6, 2014) (noting that the development of the Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations was one of the four main tasks comprising
UNCTAD’s work program).
39 Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, May 1983, 23
I.L.M.
626
(1984)
[hereinafter
Draft
UN
Code],
available
at
33
34
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International Economic Order centered on “controlling the political
[and] economic activities of TNCs, out of the concern of developing
countries about their sovereignty.” 40 The draft Code contained
provisions on competition and restrictive business practices. 41
However, the negotiations were hampered by a climate of
confrontation and mistrust 42 and differing perspectives about the
objectives, nature and scope of the proposed Code. While the
developing countries argued for a binding code, the developed
countries preferred an instrument containing non-binding
guidelines. 43 It was also difficult to develop a consensus on how to
treat the transnational corporations, 44 especially as regards the
power of States to regulate their rights of entry and
establishment, 45 to nationalize their interests and the scope of
compensation payable 46 as well as to subject them to national
dispute settlement procedures. 47 According to the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 1980s
witnessed a change in its focus to the positive, rather than the
negative, effects of foreign direct investment and TNCs and that
such change in attitude “contributed to the stalling of the Code
negotiations . . . .” 48 In the end, there was no agreement and the
draft code was shelved.
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2891 (last visited
Apr. 7, 2015).
40
UNCTC
Evolution,
UNCTAD,
available
at
http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/UNCTCEvolution.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
41 Draft UN Code, supra note 39, ¶ 35.
42 UNCTC Evolution, supra note 40.
43 The text of the draft Code reveals this tension. Many of the obligations to
be imposed on transnational corporations offer two alternatives: “shall” or
“should,” denoting binding and non-binding obligations, respectively. See, e.g.,
Draft UN Code, supra note 39, ¶ 45:
Transnational corporations should/shall supply to the competent
authorities in each of the countries in which they operate, upon request
or on a regular basis as specified by those authorities, and in accordance
with national legislation, all information required for legislative and
administrative purposes relevant to the activities and policies of their
entities in the country concerned.
44 Paul Kuruk, Controls on Technology Transfer: An Analysis of the Southern
Response to Northern Technological Protectionism, 13 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 301, 320
(1989).
45 Draft U.N. Code, supra note 39, ¶ 47.
46 Id. ¶ 54.
47 Id. ¶¶ 55–58.
48 UNCTC Evolution, supra note 40.
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Although UNCTAD failed in its bid to develop a code of
conduct for TNCs, it was successful in developing the Set of
Multilaterally Approved Equitable Principles and Rules for the
Control of Restrictive Business Practices (Set of Principles). 49 The
UN General Assembly adopted the instrument on December 5,
1980.
Objectives of the Set of Principles are stated to include the
attainment of
greater efficiency in international trade and development . .
. through . . . [t]he creation, encouragement and protection
of competition; [the] [c]ontrol of the concentration of capital
and/or economic power; [and the] [e]ncouragement of
innovation.” 50 Additional objectives include the promotion
of social welfare and the interests of consumers; 51 and the
“eliminat[ion of] the disadvantages to trade and
development which may result from the restrictive business
practices of transnational corporations. 52
The Set of Principles defines restrictive business practices as:
acts or behaviour of enterprises which, through an abuse or
acquisition and abuse of a dominant position of market
power, limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain
competition, having or being likely to have adverse effects
on international trade, particularly that of developing
countries, . . . or which through formal, informal, written or
unwritten agreements or arrangements among enterprises,
have the same impact. 53
Restrictive business practices specifically condemned include
49 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The United
Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition, U.N. Doc.
TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.2
(2000),
available
at
http://unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf10r2.en.pdf.
50 Id. at A2(a)-(c).
51 Id. at A3.
52 Id. at A4.
53 Id. at B(i)(1).
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price-fixing agreements, collusive tendering, market or customer
allocation arrangements 54 and predatory behavior towards
competitors. 55
While the adoption of the Set of Principles marked an
important milestone in the efforts to develop a multilateral
framework on competition policy, the non-binding nature of the
instrument has limited its usefulness. As noted in its preamble, the
principles “take the form of recommendations” 56 only, and
therefore are hortatory, and not intended to create directly
enforceable rights and obligations.
2.3.

WTO Ministerial Conferences

At the first session of the WTO ministerial conference held in
Singapore in 1996, some members called for negotiations in the
WTO for agreements on competition policy, 57 a request which the
developing countries opposed. 58 As a compromise, the Singapore
Ministerial created 59 the Working Group on the Interaction
Between Trade and Competition Policy (Working Group on
Competition Policy) “to study issues raised by Members relating to
the interaction between trade and competition policy, including
anti-competitive practices, in order to identify any areas that may
merit further consideration in the WTO framework.” 60 The
Ministers directed the General Council to monitor the work under
review for two years before determining “how the work of [the]

Id. at D3(a), (b), (c).
Id. at D4.
56 Id. at 9.
57 Initial proposals for a WTO framework on competition came from the
European Union and the United States. See Khor, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that
despite a lack of consensus, “the four Singapore issues were brought onto the
Singapore Ministerial agenda through the device of a cover letter written by the
WTO Director General to the Trade Ministers”).
58
India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Tanzania were among the developing
countries that opposed the initiatives on international competition policy. Id.
59 World Trade Org., Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996,
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 36 I.L.M. 218, ¶ 20 (1997) [hereinafter Singapore Ministerial
Declaration],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm.
60 Id. ¶ 20.
54
55
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body should proceed.” 61 However, they underscored their clear
understanding “that future negotiations, if any, regarding
multilateral disciplines in these areas, will take place only after an
explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO Members
regarding such negotiations.” 62
The declaration issued at the next ministerial conference in
Geneva 63 on May 20, 1998 did not contain specific references to
competition policy, although it called for recommendations to
ensure expeditious conclusion of the work program set out during
the Singapore conference. 64 In the lead up to the Third Ministerial
conference in Seattle, concrete proposals for the launching of WTO
negotiations on competition policy were submitted in July and
August 1999 by several countries. Despite protracted discussions,
the conference was unable to narrow gaps that had emerged on a
number of critical issues and the Ministers resolved to “’take a time
out, consult with one another, and find creative means to finish the
job’” of the conference. 65 As a result, no concrete decisions were
taken in Seattle with respect to future work on competition policy
in the WTO.
At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, however, the
Ministers on November 14, 2001 “[r]ecogniz[ed] the case for a
multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of competition
policy to international trade and development, and the need for
enhanced technical assistance and capacity-building in this area.” 66
Id.
Id.
63
World Trade Org., Geneva Ministerial Declaration of 20 May 1998,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min98_e/mindec_e.htm.
64
The General Council’s work program included recommendations
concerning “other possible future work on the basis of the work programme
initiated at Singapore.” Id. ¶ 9(b). Specifically, the Ministers required the General
Council to submit at the third session of the ministerial conference “on the basis of
consensus, recommendations for decision concerning the further organization and
management of the work programme arising from [the terms of the declaration],
including the scope, structure and time-frames, that will ensure that the work
programme is begun and concluded expeditiously.” Id. ¶ 10.
65 See Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Briefing Note: 3 December—
The Final Day and What Happens Next (Dec. 3, 1999), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/about_e/re
sum03_e.htm (quoting a statement by Conference Chairperson Charlene
Barshefsky, who also noted the difficulties presented by the differences of
opinion).
66
World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
61
62
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They agreed that negotiations would take place after the next
ministerial conference “on the basis of a decision to be taken, by
explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations.” 67
The Ministers instructed the Working Group on Competition
Policy to focus until the next ministerial conference “on
clarification of: core principles, including transparency, nondiscrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hard
core cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for
progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in
developing countries through capacity building.” 68 The Working
Group on Competition Policy was also to take “[f]ull account . . . of
the needs of developing and least-developed country participants
and [provide] appropriate flexibility . . . to address them.” 69
Even after the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2003,
there was still no consensus on modalities for negotiations on
competition policy, although the Ministers had reaffirmed their
“Doha Declarations and Decisions and recommit[ted themselves]
to working to implement them fully and faithfully.” 70 The
Chairperson of the conference noted on September 14, 2003 that
despite considerable movement in consultations, members
remained entrenched particularly on the Singapore issues, such as
competition. 71
Shortly after, some WTO members moved that the issue of
competition be dropped from the Doha agenda. 72 On August 1,
2004, the WTO General Council decided that competition policy
“will not form part of the Work Programme set out in that
Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, ¶ 23 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.
67 Id. ¶ 20.
68 Id. ¶ 25.
69 Id. ¶ 25.
70
World Trade Org., Cancun Ministerial Conference Summary of 14
September
2003,
¶
6,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.ht
m#statement (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
71
World Trade Org., Cancun Ministerial Statement, WT/MIN(03)/20,
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2015).
72 Khor, supra note 9, at 16.
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on . . .[that] issue[] will take place within the WTO during the Doha
Round.” 73 Accordingly, the Working Group on Competition
Policy ceased to be active.
3. IMPLICATIONS OF A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK
ON COMPETITION POLICY
3.1.

EU Proposals Regarding a Multilateral Framework on
Competition

The EU was the principal proponent in the WTO for the
adoption of a multilateral framework on competition. 74 In
submissions to the Working Group on Competition Policy, the EU
proposed elements of a multilateral framework based on core
principles, cooperation and support for developing countries. 75
Specifically,
WTO negotiations on competition should . . . [focus] on
three key issues: core principles on domestic competition
law and policy; cooperation modalities, including both
case-specific cooperation and more general exchanges of
experiences; and support for the reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries, including
through a more coherent and enhanced approach to
technical assistance for capacity building.” 76
Regarding the core principles, the EU explained that they
“would relate to the domestic legislative framework” 77 and “could
73 See Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on
1
August
2004,
WT/L/579,
¶
1(g),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm.
74 Julien Moiroux, The Internationalisation of Competition Policy: The EU and the
WTO Between Boldness and Rally, 2 GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 38, 38 (2009).
75 Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy,
Communication from the European Community and Its Member States,
WT/WGTCP/W/152 (Sept. 25, 2000), at 5 [hereinafter Communication from the
European
Community
(Sept.
25,
2000)],
available
at
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search.S.S001.aspx.
76 Id. at 4.
77 Id. at 5.
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be largely based on transparency and non-discrimination.” The
EU argued the core principles were “both central to the
multilateral trading system and to domestic competition law
regimes.” 78 Elaborating on these concepts, the EU contended that
“competition law should be based on the principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of the nationality of firms” (emphasis
added), 79 a view it considered to be self-evident:
[t]he importance of non-discrimination – both MFN and
National Treatment – for both the multilateral trading
system and national competition laws hardly needs
stressing. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any situation in
which a competition law regime would establish any
distinction on the basis of the nationality of firms. 80
Thus, application of the principle of non-discrimination in the
context of competition law and policy “would mean an obligation
not to formally discriminate against firms on the basis of their
corporate nationality.” 81 The EU argued that the prevalence of
unique discriminatory treatment, such as discriminatory use of
taxation, justified the “inclusion of the principle of nondiscrimination in a WTO framework agreement on competition by
way of a separate, specific provision . . . [to] take into account the
particularities of competition law and policy.” 82 Although
competition-related provisions already exist in other WTO
agreements, 83 the EU contended they were too “area and/or issue
Id.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
80 Id.
81 Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy,
Communication from the European Community and Its Member States,
WT/WGTCP/W/160 (Mar. 14, 2001), at 2 [hereinafter Communication from the
European
Community
(Mar.
14,
2001)],
available
at
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_S_S001.aspx.
82 Id.
83 For example, both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contain rules on
monopolies and exclusive service suppliers while the Agreement on the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) recognizes the right of
governments to act against anti-competitive practices. See Understanding the WTO:
Cross-Cutting and New Issues: Investment, Competition, Procurement, Simpler
Procedures,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm
78
79

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/1

KURUK (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

5/8/2015 6:24 PM

NEGOTIATING COMPETITION POLICY

665

specific” 84 to be useful in tackling competition issues with
international dimensions.
In terms of scope, the principle of transparency would apply to
laws, regulations and other government measures taken in
application of domestic competition law, including “not only to
publications of relevant laws and regulations, but also, perhaps
more importantly, to guidelines, as appropriate, for their future
application and interpretation, as well as possible exclusions and
exemptions.” 85
It would also extend to notions of “due process” and the
availability of effective domestic remedies 86 and in that sense
would include “procedures through which private parties can have
access to the competition authorities, guarantees of due process in
competition investigations and enforcement, basic standards of
protection of confidential information, a right of appeal against
administrative decisions and the role of the judiciary in the
enforcement process.” 87 Because the due process guarantees
resemble requirements of the principle of procedural fairness, they
can also be used to illustrate the scope of that principle. 88

(last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
84 As the EU argues,
despite the competition-related provisions in a number of existing WTO
agreements such as TRIPS and GATS (including the reference paper on
basic telecommunications), all of these are area and/or issue-specific.
The globalisation of our economy calls for a horizontal, generally
applicable framework.
Clearly, principles on interconnection for
telecommunication would alone offer little help in tackling international
cartels.
Communication from the European Community (Mar. 14, 2001), supra note 81, at 2.
85
Id. For a survey of exemptions and exclusions in national laws, see
generally Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition
Policy, Note by Secretariat: Exceptions, Exemptions and Exclusions Contained in
Members’ National Competition Legislation, WT/WGTCP/W/172 (July 6, 2001).
86 Communication from the European Community (Sept. 25, 2000), supra note 75,
at 7.
87 Id.
88 Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy,
Provisions on Procedural Fairness in Existing WTO Agreements: Background Note by
the Secretariat, ¶ 16, WT/WGTCP/W/231 (May 22, 2003) [hereinafter Provisions on
Procedural Fairness in Existing WTO Agreements].
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Underscoring the relevance of the core principles, the EU noted
that
they ensure a level playing field and equal competitive
opportunities for firms, their products and services, and
help bring about a higher degree of predictability to enable
firms to familiarise themselves with existing rules and
regulations before making major business decisions, just as
consumers may become more familiar with their rights. 89
Specifically, they will ensure “a level playing field between domestic
and foreign operators (and their goods and services) as well as between
all foreign operators.” 90 (Emphasis added).
According to the EU, “affirming such principles as WTO
commitments would reinforce their value in the domestic legal
system and establish a stronger basis for mutual trust and
cooperation among competition authorities.” 91 In addition, “for
those WTO Members who have not yet adopted domestic
competition laws, a WTO agreement would provide important
principles to be incorporated in the drafting of domestic
competition law.” 92 Furthermore, “a WTO Agreement would help
lock Members into the principles of transparency and nondiscrimination, making their legal regimes transparent and
predictable and limiting the possibility of recourse to formal
discriminatory treatment at a later point in time.” 93
3.2.

The WTO Principles of Non-Discrimination, Transparency
and Procedural Fairness

As noted by the EU, the principles of non-discrimination
(national treatment and most favored nation treatment) and

89

at 2.
90
91
92
93

Communication from the European Community (Mar. 14, 2001), supra note 81,
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
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transparency constitute core principles of the WTO. 94 For example,
the principle of national treatment is found in the three main WTO
agreements dealing with trade in goods, 95 trade in services, 96 and
intellectual property rights, 97 as well as other agreements that form
annexes to the WTO Agreement. 98 In each agreement, the national
treatment principle is expressed in terms of a no less favorable
treatment standard as exemplified by the language in GATT
Article III(4):
The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party
shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution
or use. 99

94 For example, in their directives to the Working Group on Competition
Policy, the Ministers at the Doha Ministerial Conference referred to the need to
“focus on the clarification of [the] core principles, including transparency, nondiscrimination and procedural fairness.” Doha Declaration, supra note 66, ¶ 25.
95
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. III, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1867
U.N.T.S.
187,
33
I.L.M.
1153,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm.
Of particular
relevance is Article III, which requires national treatment in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of goods.
96
Agreement on Trade in Services art. XVII, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183, 33 I.L.M. 1167, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26gats.pdf.
97 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 3,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex
1C,
1869
U.N.T.S.
299;
33
I.L.M.
1197,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm.
98 These include Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 15, 1993,
1868 U.N.T.S. 120, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17tbt.pdf; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Dec.
15,
1993,
1867
U.N.T.S.
493,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm; and the Agreement
on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 508, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_01_e.htm.
99
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III(4), Oct. 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
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Therefore, the principle of national treatment imposes on a
WTO Member an obligation not to put the goods or services or
persons of other WTO Members at a competitive disadvantage visa-vis its own goods or services or nationals. However, it does not
preclude the WTO Member from granting to foreign goods and
services terms that are more favorable than are given to domestic
goods and services. 100
Similarly, the principle of the most-favored-nation treatment
requires a WTO Member not to discriminate between other WTO
Members. It is also reflected in the three main WTO agreements, 101
but in varying language. While two of the agreements use
traditional language in referring to the obligation to extend
“immediately and unconditionally” to all WTO Members “any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” granted by a
Member, 102 the third uses a “treatment no less favourable”
standard for expressing its most favored nation obligation. 103
The concept of transparency as a core principle of the WTO has
two key components. First is the obligation to publish, or at least
make publicly available, all relevant regulations, and, as a general
rule, not to apply or enforce them until this has been done. 104
100 Explaining the term “national treatment” with reference to section 337 of
the US Tariff Act of 1930, a WTO publication notes:

The words ‘treatment no less favourable’ in paragraph 4 call for effective
equality of opportunities for imported products in respect of the
application of laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal
sale, . . . purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products. This
clearly sets a minimum permissible standard as a basis. On the other
hand, contracting parties may apply to imported products different
formal legal requirements if doing so would accord imported products
more favourable treatment.
Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy,
Background Note by the Secretariat: The Fundamental WTO Principles of National
Treatment,
Most-Favoured-Nation
Treatment
and
Transparency,
WT/WGTCP/W/114, ¶ 31 (Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter The Fundamental WTO
Principles of National Treatment].
101 Provisions requiring a WTO Member not to discriminate between other
WTO Members can be found in other agreements relating to trade in goods that
form part of Annex IA of the WTO Agreement.
102
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
supra note 97, art. 4; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, supra note 95,
art. I.
103 Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 96, art. II.
104
With regard to publication, the provisions of the three main WTO
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Often linked to this is the obligation to provide for the impartial
administration of such regulations and the right of review of
decisions taken under them. 105 The second component comprises
provisions on the notification of various forms of governmental
action to the WTO and other Members. 106
The term “procedural fairness” is not defined in any WTO
agreement. 107 However, many of its requirements are closely
related to the principle of transparency. 108 The principle of
Agreements containing this obligation are: (i) General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, supra note 95, art. X; (ii) Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 96, art.
III; (iii) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 97, art. 63. Many of the other agreements that make up Annex IA of the
WTO Agreement, relating to trade in goods, also contain a publication obligation.
See generally Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.
105
Article X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade contains
provisions on the uniform, impartial and reasonable administration of trade
measures and the right of review of action taken pursuant to them. Provisions of
this nature can be found in many other WTO Agreements, including the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (in particular Article VI), the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (in particular Articles 41–42 and
62) and in various Annex IA Agreements, such as those on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Anti-Dumping Measures, Customs Valuation, Import
Licensing Procedures and Pre-Shipment Inspection.
106

As described in a WTO publication:

The notification provisions contained in the [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] and other agreements relating to trade in goods are
numerous and diverse . . . . Some of these are of broad application; for
example, most WTO rules-based agreements require the notification of
implementing legislation and any changes to such legislation. Some of
these provisions call for notifications on a periodic basis, such as
biannual reports on countervailing and anti-dumping actions. Some
notifications only have to be made when a particular trade action is taken
or contemplated, such as a safeguard action. Still others only have to be
made on a “one-time” basis, for example at the time of the coming into
force of the WTO Agreement. Apart from such notification provisions,
use is also made of other devices for ensuring that the WTO and its
Members have adequate information about the practices of Members;
these include requirements to make available enquiry or contact points,
the possibility for “reverse” notifications to be made by an affected
Member about another Member’s practices, and obligations to provide
information on request.
The Fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, supra note 100, ¶ 56.
107 Provisions on Procedural Fairness in Existing WTO Agreements, supra note 88,
¶ 5.
108 Id. ¶ 21.
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procedural fairness calls for the publication of governmental
measures of general application and requires that these measures
are published, as a general rule, before they are applied. 109 In
addition, the measures should be administered “in a uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner or in a fair and equitable way” 110
with the possibility for appeal or review of decisions on the
application of such measures. 111
Proposals by the EU to incorporate these core principles in a
multilateral framework on competition were opposed strongly by
many developing countries that were concerned about the
potential negative implications of the suggestions. 112 They
questioned the propriety of such incorporation, pointing out that
the “principles [are] not universally applicable to all issues,
developed as they were in the context of the original purpose of
the GATT as an agreement to facilitate reduction of barriers to
international trade in goods.” 113
There were concerns that extending the national treatment
principle to a competition framework “may mean that ‘national
treatment’ has to be ensured for foreign firms (and their goods and
services) vis-à-vis local firms in the domestic market” 114 and that
“[s]uch ‘equality’ would only accentuate the inequality in market
outcomes, since local firms are generally smaller than the large
foreign firms and transnational corporations (TNCs).” 115
Moreover, “[i]t would curb the right of developing country
governments to provide advantages to local firms, and local firms
themselves may be restricted from practices, which are to their
advantage.” 116
Some commentators consider the proposals on nondiscrimination to have been part of an attempt to link competition
policy “to market access, in which foreign firms and their products
and services should have the right to ‘free competition’ vis-à-vis
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 16(a)(ii).
111 Id.
112 Khor, supra note 10, at 29.
113 Cecilia Oh, TWN Briefing Paper No. 18: Trade and Competition Policy in
the WTO, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, at 3 (2003) [hereinafter TWN Briefing Paper
No. 18], available at http://www.twn.my/title2/briefing_papers/No18.pdf.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2.
109
110
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local firms in markets of developing countries.” 117 Under that
approach, “’[f]ree competition’ would . . . mean that the
preferences given to local firms, and any advantages or assistance
they enjoy, should be curtailed or eliminated, so that the foreign
firms can compete on a level playing field.” 118 This would make it
possible for “the transnational corporations of the US, Europe,
Japan, etc, . . . to compete on ‘equal ground’ as local companies in
the local markets.” 119
However, that would be problematic and inequitable because
the “transnational corporations already enjoy great advantages,
including big size, large financial resources, high technology,
marketing networks, and brand names.” 120 Therefore,
there is no ‘level playing field’ to begin with [and w]ithout
some assistance, preferential treatment, or home-ground
advantages (such as being familiar with the local language
and customs, and having a distribution system built over
generations), the local companies of developing countries
will not be able to survive the competition from foreign
firms.” 121
Developing countries also took issue with the EU proposal that
the transparency principle cover “all aspects of competition regime
117
Third World Network, EU EPAs: Economic and Social Development
Implications: The Case of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement 33
(Feb.
2009)
[hereinafter
EU
EPAs],
available
at
http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/twncariforumfeb09.pdf. As one commentator notes:

Policy-makers in major developed countries are advocating the
introduction of a new agreement on competition policy in the World
Trade Organisation so that their big corporations will be better able to
over a large share of the markets of developing countries. Ironically,
competition policy was originally understood as a means to help small
companies not to be overwhelmed by the big firms. But now it is sought
to be used by the rich countries to help their gain corporations compete
with the local firms in the developing countries.
Martin Khor, Developing Countries Resist WTO Agreement on ‘Competition’, THIRD
WORLD NETWORK, Apr. 1999, available at http://www.twn.my/title/1889-cn.htm.
118 EU EPAs, supra note 117, at 33.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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– from legislation, rules and institutional structures to decisionmaking processes, including decisions on sectoral exclusions and
exemptions.” 122 They found this to represent an unwarranted
extension of the transparency requirement in the WTO, which is
“limited only to the publication of trade regulations and does not
extend to decision-making.” 123
Finally, the principle of procedural fairness was seen to pose
significant difficulties because “developing countries with
dissimilar legal systems to developed countries, or with
insufficient resources will run the risk of not meeting the requisite
standard of procedural fairness,” 124 which under the EU proposal
would guarantee “rights of access to the system of appeal,
including right to reasoned final decision providing detailed
grounds on which such decisions were based, and the right of
parties to be heard.” 125 Moreover, “[n]otions of fundamental
fairness differ among legal systems and political and legal cultures,
and there is as yet no broad consensus on the meaning of
procedural fairness in the context of competition law
enforcement.” 126
3.3.

Policy Space of Developing Countries

The talks on competition policy in the WTO collapsed largely
due to developing country concerns that a multilateral framework
on competition was not likely to enhance the development
prospects of their economies and could even have detrimental
effects due to perceived restrictions the framework would have on
their policy space to adopt appropriate measures to promote
economic development. 127 As pointed out:
Under the EU’s proposals, a series of policy instruments
would no longer be available to ACP governments
TWN Briefing Paper No. 18, supra note 113, at 3.
Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127
See generally Michael Bailey, Oxfam et al., Unwanted, Unproductive and
Unbalanced: Six Arguments Against an Investment Agreement at the WTO (2003).
122
123
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including: monopolies granted by the state, preventing
resellers from setting prices independently, requiring that
unrelated products be sold as a package (product sale
bundling), promoting cartel behavior by a few statesupported firms, putting high barriers to entry such as
technical,
financial
or
nationality
requirements,
geographical market restrictions, arbitrary blacklisting,
price fixing, tied purchasing arrangements, product and
price dumping. 128
In an environment where domestically sourced capital is scarce
but would be needed to grow a strong and competitive sector, 129
the proposals would have limited the ability of developing country
governments to support public enterprises through the provision
of subsidies or adoption of regulatory measures to protect the
enterprises from premature or undue competition. 130
Moreover, the enforcement of the competition frameworks
proposed by the EU relies “on the existence of a strong state, with
adequate institutional, human and financial capacity to conduct
investigations, monitor markets and sanction prohibited
practices.” 131
Many developing countries simply lack the
institutional capacity to implement such policies and it would have
been “unfair, if not absurd” 132 and an unnecessary administrative
and fiscal burden 133 to subject them to the competition disciplines
of the developed countries. Thus, for the developing countries, it
made practical sense to have “far fewer and simpler competition
rules which are capable of being enforced.” 134
Therefore, it was no surprise that developing countries rejected
the “one size fits all” approach to competition policy that
underpinned the proposals brought by Western countries in the
128 Vicente Paolo B. Yu III, South Ctr., Development Challenges of Competition
Policy in the Economic Partnership Agreements 2 (2007).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 8, supra note 1, ¶ 17.
132
Ajit Singh & Rahul Dhumale, Competition Policy, Development and
Developing Countries 11 (Indian Council for Research on Int’l Econ. Relations,
Working
Paper
No.
50,
1999),
available
at
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/Singapore%20Issues/Competition/Co
mpetitionPolicy,DevelopmentandDevelopingCountries%20Ajit%20Sin.pdf.
133 Yu III, supra note 128.
134 Singh & Dhumale, supra note 132, at 11.
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WTO. Instead, they preferred a competition framework tailored to
their development needs, 135 and which would provide sufficient
policy space to implement measures affecting trade and
competition, in line with such developmental needs and objectives.
For example, as one commentator has counseled:
in the early stages of industrialisation, governments may
wish to promote ‘national champions’, that is, large
industrial groups which are likely to compete with foreign
firms both in domestic and possibly in regional markets.
Hence, governments may want to encourage, at least
initially or temporarily, some market concentration. A
competition policy primarily concerned only with the
obsessive quest for maximum competition is likely to
prevent mergers leading to market concentration whereas
industrial policy objectives might encourage the same
mergers. A classic example of a mix of competition policy
alternating market concentration and rivalry can be found
in the promotion by the Korean government of national
chaebols. 136
Furthermore, “depending on the stages of development and
productive capacity of a developing country, governments may
decide to increase or reduce the level of intra-firm competition,
hence enforcing more or less strictly competition principles.” 137
This happened in China, “where industrial policies have alternated
the promotion or restriction of intra-firm rivalry depending on the
perception of the vulnerability or strength of firms in the context of
a strategy for the promotion of a ‘team’ of national champions.” 138
Accordingly, it was prudent for developing countries to reject
the EU proposals and thereby preserve their policy options with
respect to intra-firm rivalry and restrictive business practices such

135 For a discussion on the elements of a competition policy framework for
developing countries, see Sanoussi Bilal, supra note 26, at 9–16; see also Pradeep S.
Mehta, Competition Policy in Developing Countries: An Asia-Pacific Perspective 75–87
(Mar.
7,
2010),
available
at
http://e.unescap.org/pdd/publications/bulletin2002/ch7.pdf.
136 SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 8, supra note 1, ¶ 18.
137 Id. ¶ 19.
138 Id.
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as dominant position. 139 Specific developmental objectives which
they are at liberty to pursue as part of their policy space and which
may be suitable for small and vulnerable economies include:
creating an optimum level of domestic competition, as opposed to a
maximum level of competition; 140 ensuring coordination between
competition authorities and legislators and other stakeholders
active in development promotion; 141 safeguarding the propensity
of firms to invest at high levels; 142 and regulating the behavior of
multi-national corporations which frequently enjoy a dominant
position in developing country markets. 143 Other suitable
developmental objectives are regulating how public (state) aid can
be attributed; 144 securing the policy space needed to support
national firms or sectors by reserving the right to discriminate
against foreign economic operators; 145 and ensuring that the
Id. ¶ 20.
According to the South Centre, “[t]his optimum level of competition has
to be balanced against and reflect other policy objectives, such as the promotion of
local industries and incentives for innovation and R&D.” Id. ¶ 20(a).
141 These stakeholders include “agricultural or industrial producers, trade
unions, agencies responsible for industrial policies or export promotion, as well as
all other agencies in charge of sectoral policies, e.g. education, fisheries,
transports, etc.” Id. ¶ 20(b).
142 This will entail “protecting [and] encouraging the growth of profits,
including by coordinating investment decisions and guaranteeing protected
markets. In these instances, a certain degree of market concentration may be
encouraged, rather than punished by competition policy.” Id. ¶ 20(c).
143 Because such dominant position can be used to restrict, delay or hinder
the establishment of national industries, it would be necessary to control any
abuse of dominant position in a value chain (standards or inputs). Id. ¶ 20(d).
144 This will involve
139
140

enumerating the public policy objectives that may justify the use of such
instruments or identifying priority sectors that need government support
and encouraging transparency in the attribution and use of such aid –
but not generally prohibiting the use of state aid, including in cases
where it encroaches on social policies or the promotion of small and
medium enterprises.
Id. ¶ 20(e).
145

As has been pointed out,

[w]hile non-discrimination is a legitimate request among equal
business players, the reality in most [developing country] economies is
that markets are already tilted in favour of foreign firms, to the detriment
of much smaller local entrepreneurs. . . . For developing countries,
however, there are sound arguments why discrimination on the basis of
nationality may be useful.
Id. ¶ 20(f).
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competition framework does not require the prohibition or
privatization of state monopolies or the deregulation and
liberalization of sectors considered strategic from a developmental
perspective. 146
4. COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNIONWEST AFRICA EPA NEGOTIATIONS
4.1.

Competition as an Issue in the EPA Negotiations

African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries are involved in
negotiations with the EU to replace the existing trade agreement
governing trading relations between the EU and the ACP (the
Cotonou Agreement) 147 with new trade agreements to be called
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). 148 Unsurprisingly, the
EU has sought to introduce into the negotiations the same elements
of a multilateral framework on competition that were rejected at
the WTO. For example, in its recommendations on June 17, 2002
authorizing the European Commission to negotiate economic
partnership agreements with the ACP countries and regions, the
EU General Affairs Council noted that the EU was seeking a
regulatory framework based “on principles of non-discrimination,
openness, transparency and stability and on general principles of
protection, which will endorse the best results agreed in the
competent international fora or bilaterally.” 149 This section surveys
the evolution of the competition policy debate in the EPA
negotiations between the EU and one of the regions, West Africa. 150
146

¶ 20(g).

These include education, energy, health, transportation, and finance. Id.

147 Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean
and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its
Member States, of the Other Part, Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, Dec. 15,
2000, L317 O.J. 3 [hereinafter Cotonou Agreement], available at
http://www.acp.int/sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/Cotonou2000.pdf.
148 See generally SOUTH CENTRE FACT SHEET NO. 1, supra note 2.
149
Memorandum by Traidcraft Exchange PLC, § 10, WWW.PARLIAMENT.UK,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/104/10
4we13.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (delineating memorandum to the UK
Parliamentary Select Committee on the European Union).
150 The ACP countries have been divided into six regional groups with each
group negotiating a separate EPA with the EU. These regional groups consist of:
West Africa; East and Southern Africa; Southern African Development
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The EPA negotiations with West Africa were launched in
Cotonou in October 2003. 151 In their preliminary talks to set the
agenda for the negotiations, while the EU and West Africa seemed
to agree on the general objectives for the negotiations, some
differences emerged regarding the content of the negotiations. 152 A
key point of divergence concerned the order and prioritization of
the negotiation themes, with West Africa contending there was
need to first consolidate the integration process and create a
regional market with EU assistance, before negotiating the content
of the free trade agreement between the two regions. 153 The EU,
however, had no intention of linking the opening of trade
negotiations with the completion beforehand of the West African
integration process.
Another stumbling block concerned consistency with the
multilateral negotiations at the WTO, particularly as regards the
opening of discussions on the Singapore issues, 154 such as
investment and competition policy. West Africa rejected the EU
proposal to negotiate those issues, pointing to the stalemate in the
WTO regarding the opening of negotiations on those matters. 155
A roadmap setting the timetable for the negotiations was
adopted 156 on August 4, 2004, which reflected some compromises
in the divergent positions that had emerged.
While the
consolidation of West African regional integration remained a
priority, 157 completion of the process was not to be made a

Community (SADC); Central Africa; the Caribbean (CARIFORUM); and the
Pacific.
151
Econ. Cmty. of West African States & Eur. Comm’n, Road Map for
Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations Between West Africa and the European
Community
(2004),
¶
3
[hereinafter
ROADMAP],
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/october/tradoc_118923.pdf.
152
State of the EPA Negociations [sic] Between West Africa and the European
Community, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (2005) [hereinafter State of the EPA
Negotiations],
available
at
http://hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/twn_africa_ecowas_eu_epa_status_report.pdf
(presenting an unpublished memorandum prepared by West Africa’s negotiators
summarizing key developments after the adoption in August 2004 of a road map
for the negotiations).
153 Id. at 1.
154 Id. at 12.
155 See infra notes 57–73 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the
WTO initiative to open negotiations on the Singapore issues.
156 ROADMAP, supra note 151, ¶ 5.
157 Id. ¶ 7.
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precondition to the trade negotiations. On the matter of the
Singapore issues, West Africa agreed only to discuss with the EU
its regional integration process and to explore arrangements
concerning competition and investment that would be relevant to
such process. 158 Significantly, barely 3 days before the adoption of
the roadmap, the WTO had resolved on August 1, 2004 to drop the
issue of competition from the Doha agenda, and therefore, not to
pursue discussions for the adoption of a multilateral framework on
competition. Apparently, the WTO decision had a predictable
effect on the scope of the EPA negotiations.
The roadmap identified two objectives relevant to discussions
on competition policy within the framework of EPA negotiations.
The first was “facilitation of an enabling environment for
investment to mobilise internal resources and also promote the
inflow of foreign capital, particularly by ensuring transparent,
stable and feasible conditions” 159 and the second, “[t]he adoption
of a Community legal framework on competition to remedy the
issue of anti-competition practices in the region.” 160 Preparatory
activities ahead of the EPA negotiations were identified to include
the “definition, at the appropriate time, of objectives and
procedures for investment, competition and intellectual
property” 161 and the “formulation of proposals for capacity
building and other support measures in . . . competition . . .
policies.” 162
158
159
160
161
162

State of the EPA Negotiations, supra note 152, at 2.
ROADMAP, supra note 151, ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 45.
The other preparatory activities for the negotiations involved:

[i] definition of the EPA reference framework with regard to the
technical barriers to trade and SPS measures, customs procedure and
trade facilitation, with a view to ensuring free movement of goods within
the region and between the region and the European Union; [ii]
harmonisation of the policies on standardisation, certification and SPS
measures; [iii] definition of a reference framework for border protection
measures (customs tariffs and other measures); . . . [iv] definition of the
general structure of the EPA (areas to be covered by the EPA); [v]
conduct of the analyses of different liberalisation options for trade in
goods and services; [vi] formulation of proposals for capacity building
and other support measures in the various areas open to negotiation
[such as] border protection measures, technical barriers to trade and SPS
measures, . . . competition and intellectual property policies; and [vii]
negotiation of the timeframe for liberalisation and the conclusion of the
EPA.
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An indicative schedule for the negotiations designated the
period April 2005–September 2005 for work on the definition of the
objectives and procedures related to investments, competition and
intellectual property. 163 Two technical meetings were to be
organized to identify objectives and implementation procedures
with regard to investment, competition and intellectual property
policies, as well as their link with the harmonization process in the
West African region. 164 It was also agreed that a Regional
Preparatory Task Force 165 would meet to make proposals on
capacity building in these areas and the support needed for the
successful completion of the harmonization process, in line with
the objectives of the EPA. 166 In accordance with this plan, five
thematic groups, including one on Investment and Competition,
were established after the adoption of the roadmap to work out
negotiation strategies for the EPAS.
In April 2006, a West African regional body comprising trade
ministers and representatives from the West African countries
resolved that competition issues should be removed from the EPA
process and instead, the focus should be on harmonizing the
competition policies of ECOWAS member states into a common
Id.

Id. ¶ 63.
Id.
165 The Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) is a joint structure between
West Africa and the European Union created “to facilitate the links and coherence
between cooperation for development funding and the EPA.” ROADMAP, supra
note 151, ¶ 53. “On the West African side, the RPTF comprises the representatives
of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, the UEMOA Commission and the National
Authorising Officers responsible for [the European Development Fund].” Id.
166 The specific objectives of the RPTF are to
163
164

contribute to the efficient delivery of support to the West African region
in its preparation, negotiation and implementation of the EPA and
notably for the: [a] [i]dentification and evaluation of existing support
measures that can respond to needs that are jointly agreed by the
negotiators; [b] [p]reparation of pre-identification projects/programme
sheets to be forwarded to the structures in charge of development
cooperation financing, in accordance with the provisions of the Cotonou
Agreement, based on the different support measures agreed upon by the
negotiators, and particularly those needed to implement the EPA
reference framework for the region and the West African countries; [c]
[s]uggestions for the sourcing of financing from the European Union for
the projects and programmes and proposals for their effective
implementation.
Id. ¶ 54.
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code, as was envisaged in the roadmap. 167 In accordance with this
decision, the West African strategy now centered on seeking
cooperation from the EU in regards to the region’s own program
on competition, rather than the establishment and enforcement of a
common competition regulatory framework under the EPA.
4.2.

EU Proposals to West Africa

On April 4, 2007, the EU formally presented its proposals for
the EPA negotiations to West Africa. 168 The chapter on
competition provided that the parties would “recognise the
importance of free and undistorted competition in their trade
relations . . . [and] acknowledge that anti-competitive business
practices have the potential to distort the proper functioning of
markets and generally undermine the benefits of trade
liberalization.” 169 Consequently, they would agree that the certain
practices restricting competition would be incompatible with the
proper functioning of the EPA Agreement. 170 The first group was
identified to include “agreements and concerted practices between
undertakings, which have the object or effect of substantially
preventing or lessening competition in the territory of the
European Community or of the West African Party as a whole or in
a substantial part thereof.” 171 The second type concerned the
“abuse by one or more undertakings of market power in the
territory of the European Community or of the West African Party
as a whole or in a substantial part thereof.” 172
In addition, the Parties would be required to maintain laws
addressing restrictions on competition within their jurisdictions,
and designate a body for the implementation of such laws and
regulations. 173 A Party that did not have such laws or body in
place as of the entry into force of the EPA agreement, would have
ROADMAP, supra note 151, ¶ 22.
Eur. Comm’n, EC Working Document: Economic Partnership Agreement
Between the West African States, ECOWAS and UEMOA, of the One Part, and the
European Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part (Apr. 4, 2007).
169 Id. art. 2(1).
170 Id.
171 Id. art. 2(1)(a).
172 Id. art. 2(1)(b).
173 Id. art. 3(1).
167

168
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five years to do so. 174 Significantly, the EU proposals incorporated
by reference, as part of the definition of competition laws,
“[a]rticles 81, 82 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community,
and
their
implementing
regulations
or
amendments.” 175
With regard to public enterprises and enterprises to which
special or exclusive rights have been granted, the Parties would
ensure that . . . there is neither enacted nor maintained any
measure distorting trade in goods or services between the
Parties to an extent contrary to the Parties interest, and that
such enterprises shall be subject to the rules of competition
in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct
the performance, in law or in fact or the particular tasks
assigned to them. 176
Also, the Parties would
progressively adjust . . . any State monopolies of a
commercial nature character, so as to ensure that, by the
end of the [fifth] year following the entry into force of [the
EPA] Agreement, no discrimination regarding the
conditions under which goods are procured and marketed
[would] exist[] between nationals of the EU Member States
and those of the West African States. 177
Furthermore, the Joint EPA Council would be informed about the
measures adopted to implement this objective. 178
The EU proposals contained provisions for the exchange of
information and cooperation in connection with enforcement and
capacity building. For example, the competition authority of one
Party could inform its counterpart in the other Party about its
willingness to co-operate with respect to enforcement matters, but

174
175
176
177
178

Id. art. 3(2).
Id. art. 1(3)(a).
Id. art. 5(2).
Id. art. 5(3).
Id.
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such cooperation would not compromise their independence. 179
The competition authorities could also exchange non-confidential
information, subject to the standards of confidentiality of each
Party. 180
4.3.

Draft Joint Text

The working document used as the basis for the EPA
negotiations is referred to as the Draft Joint Text, 181 and it is the text
of the original EU proposals which was revised to delete
provisions with respect to which there was no mutual agreement
to proceed with negotiations as well as to capture West Africa’s
proposals. The chapter on competition in the Draft Joint Text is
captioned “cooperation on competition” 182 instead of
“competition” as contained in the EU’s original proposals. It
retains as “incompatible with the smooth operation of [the
EPA]” 183 the two groups of anti-competitive activities previously
identified in the EU proposals 184 and adds two new ones
concerning “[a]ny state aid leading to a distortion to competition or
threat thereof by favouring some companies over others,” 185 and
“[a]nti-trust practices imputable to the member states of their
respective communities.” 186 However, no obligation is imposed on
the Parties to prohibit such anti-competitive acts within the
framework of the EPA.
Significantly, the EU proposal for the adoption of competition
rules and establishment of a competition authority within 5 years
of the entry into force of the EPA has been dropped from the Draft
Joint Text. Instead, there is provision to the effect that: “[w]ith a
Id. art. 4(1).
Id. art. 4(2).
181 EPA Draft Text: Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) Between the
West African States, ECOWAS and UEMOA, on the One Part and the European
Community and Its Members States, on the Other Part (Sept. 17, 2010) [hereinafter
Draft Joint Text] (on file with Author) (presenting the draft text that is the result of
negotiations in Brussels, Belgium, referred to as the Draft Joint Text).
182
Id. tit. IV, ch. 1 (discussing trade in Title IV: Trade-Related Areas, in
chapter 1, entitled “Cooperation on Competition”).
183 Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 1.
184 See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
185 Draft Joint Text, supra note 181, tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 1(1)(iii).
186 Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 1(1)(iv).
179
180
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view to limiting the adverse effects and repercussions of the anticompetitive practices . . . , the two Parties [would] strive to set up a
cooperation framework for the promotion and implementation of
healthy and effective anti-competitive policies and rules.” 187
The specific areas of cooperation agreed to in the Draft Joint
Text include the EU’s support to the West Africa region for the
establishment of national and regional competition regulatory
frameworks, 188 capacity building of national and regional
authorities, 189 and the training of judicial and other personnel
responsible for the regulation and control of competition in the
West Africa region. 190 Other areas of cooperation involve the
management of disputes arising from the application of
competition rules, 191 exchange of information on official aid
regimes such as subsidies, 192 and information on anti-competitive
practices observed on their respective territories 193 as well as
assistance to combat the anti-competitive practices of
multinationals. 194
The Draft Joint Text also excludes the rules regarding State
enterprises introduced in the original EU proposals. 195 Instead, it
notes that “[n]o provision [in the EPA] may be interpreted as
prohibiting a Party from granting special or exclusive rights,
delegating or maintaining state or private monopolies in
conformity with legislation.” 196 However, the Parties are to
“ensure that state enterprises and those accorded special rights are
subjected to competition rules, insofar as their application does not
impinge on the de facto and de jure accomplishment of the special
tasks assigned them.” 197
Significantly, the provisions of the Draft Joint Text on
competition focus exclusively on a cooperation framework and do
not include the core principles of non-discrimination and
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 1(2).
Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(a).
Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(b).
Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(c).
Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(d).
Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(e).
Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(f).
Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 2(g).
See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text.
Draft Joint Text, supra note 181, tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 3(1).
Id. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 3(2).
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transparency originally proposed by the EU in the WTO for
incorporation in multilateral competition policies and
subsequently endorsed in the EU’s initial EPA proposals.
Therefore, if the competition-related provisions of the Draft Joint
Text were to be adopted in a final EPA without modification, they
would not adversely affect the policy space of West African
governments to implement competition policies that reflect their
specific developmental needs.
5. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: A REGIONAL
COMPETITION FRAMEWORK
5.1.

Regional Priorities

With the refusal of West African negotiators to discuss
substantive commitments on competition policy, priority in the
region turned to the harmonization of the policies of ECOWAS
Member States “within the context of the formulation of a
community regulatory framework on competition.” 198 This
stemmed from the recognition that on-going efforts to promote
regional economic growth would be enhanced by the adoption of a
sound regional framework for competition. 199 Indeed, regional
policy makers characterized competition policy as a “necessary
complement to trade policy and as such should be a central part of
the ECOWAS system.” 200 They justified the adoption of a regional
competition policy as follows:
A well designed and vigorously enforced regional
competition regulation framework will help to concretely
deliver on the goals of the ECOWAS integration strategy,
by reducing the risk of trade disputes and policies of trade
defences, contributing to increased productivity and
economic growth, and ultimately raising the standard of
living of the citizens of the Community. Furthermore, the
198 ECOWAS, Regional Competition Policy Framework (2007), at 2, available at
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/actes_add_commerce/1.Regional_Com
petition_Policy_Framework-final-P.pdf.
199 Id. at 3.
200 Id. at 5.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/1

KURUK (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

5/8/2015 6:24 PM

NEGOTIATING COMPETITION POLICY

685

development of a region-wide competition policy and
regulation will enhance the Community’s ability to
confront and address anti-competitive behavior by foreign
firms, provide a basis for involvement and cooperation on
negotiations regarding competition matters at the
multilateral level, and establish a basis for the development
of institutional competence on competition law for the
region. 201
Thus, even though West Africa was not keen about negotiating
competition policy in the context of the EPA, it nevertheless found
a competition policy specifically adapted to regional needs
priorities to be useful and supportive of the regional integration
programs instituted by ECOWAS.
In furtherance of these
objectives, work on a regional instrument was begun and resulted
in draft text, which was adopted on December 19, 2008 by the
ECOWAS Heads of State as the Supplementary Act Adopting
Community Competition Rules and the Modalities of their
Application Within ECOWAS 202 (Supplementary Act).
5.2.

Provisions

The objectives of the Supplementary Act are to promote
competition and enhance economic efficiency, prohibit anticompetitive business conduct, promote consumer welfare and
expand opportunities for domestic enterprises to participate in
The Supplementary Act prohibits as
world markets. 203
incompatible with the ECOWAS Common Market “all agreements
between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises and
concerted practices which may affect trade between ECOWAS
Member States and the object or effect of which are or may be the
prevention, restriction, distortion or elimination of competition

Id.
ECOWAS, Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 Adopting Community
Competition Rules and the Modalities of Their Application Within ECOWAS
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/actes_add_commerce/2.Supplementar
y_Act_on_competition_rules-final-P.pdf.
203 Id. art. 4(2)(d).
201

202
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within the Common Market.” 204 These include price fixing and
measures that limit or control production, share markets,
customers, or sources of supply, applying dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, or “mak[ing] the
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.” 205 Any agreement or decision prohibited as being in
restraint of trade is “automatically void and of no legal effect in
any Member State of the ECOWAS Community.” 206
Also prohibited is any abuse 207 of a dominant position by
enterprises within the ECOWAS Common Market. 208 Under the
Supplementary Act, enterprises hold a dominant position in a
relevant market if, “singularly or collectively, it/they possess a
substantial share of the market that enables it/them to control
prices or to exclude competition.” 209 Similarly, there is a
prohibition of mergers, takeovers, joint ventures, or business
combinations where the resultant market share in the ECOWAS
Common Market attributable to any good, service, line of
commerce, or activity affecting commerce leads to an abuse of
dominant market position resulting in a substantial reduction of
competition. 210 Although such structures would automatically be
void and of no effect in any Member State of ECOWAS, 211 they
could qualify for exemption “if the transaction concerned [was] in

204
205
206
207

Id. art. 5(1).
Id. art. 5(1)(e).
Id. art. 5(2).
The prohibited abuses include:

(a) limiting access to a relevant market or otherwise unduly restraining
competition; (b) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling
prices or other unfair trading conditions; (c) limiting production, markets
or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (d) applying
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) making
the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id. art. 6(2).
208 Id. art. 6(2).
209 Id. art. 6(1).
210 Id. art. 7(1).
211 Id. art. 7(2).
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the public interest.” 212
Unless exempted under the Supplementary Act, aid granted by
a Member State that “distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favoring certain enterprises or the production of certain goods” 213
is considered to be incompatible with the ECOWAS Common
Market. However, State aid would be considered compatible if it is
of a social character and is granted to individual consumers
without discrimination as to the origin of the products
concerned, 214 or if it is for the purpose of remedying damage
caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences. 215
State aid that may be considered to be compatible includes aid
given to promote socio-economic development in areas with
exceptionally low standard of living or serious underemployment;
to support culture and heritage conservation efforts and important
projects of Community interest; to facilitate the development of
certain economic activities or areas; or to remedy a serious
disturbance in the economy of a Member State. 216 It also includes
other categories of aid designated as compatible by decisions of the
Authority of Heads of State and Government on the
recommendation of the Council of Ministers acting on proposals
from the ECOWAS Competition Authority. 217
Public enterprises granted special or exclusive rights are
subject to the competition rules, and Member States are therefore
to refrain from enacting or maintaining in force any measure with
regard to such enterprises that are contrary to the provisions of the
Supplementary Act. 218 However, an exception is made for
“enterprises entrusted with the operation of services of general
economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing
monopoly” which would be subject to the competition rules, only
in so far as their application “does not obstruct the performance, in
law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.” 219 In
addition, to trigger the competition rules, the adverse effects of the
activities of the public enterprises on the “development of trade
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219

Id. art. 7(3).
Id. art. 8(1).
Id. art. 8(2)(b).
Id. art. 8(2)(b).
Id. art. 8(3).
Id. art. 8(3).
Id. art. 9(1).
Id. art. 9(2).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

KURUK (DO NOT DELETE)

688

5/8/2015 6:24 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 36:3

must be . . . [to] such an extent as would be contrary to the interests
of ECOWAS Community.” 220
Finally, the Regional Competition Authority created to oversee
the implementation of the Supplementary Act 221 has power to
exempt from the competition rules, agreements, decisions or
practices otherwise in restraint of trade which contribute “to
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress” 222 and to authorize mergers,
acquisitions, or business combinations otherwise prohibited by the
competition rules “if the transaction . . . [was] in the public
interest.” 223 The Regional Competition Authority also has power to
authorize persons to enter into agreements or engage in practices
that would violate the competition rules, 224 and victims of anticompetitive practices may apply to it for compensation for losses
they have suffered. 225
CONCLUSION
This paper has traced the competition policy issue from its
introduction by the EU in the WTO to its resurrection in the
context of the EPA negotiations. The paper also noted the refusal
of West Africa to negotiate specific commitments on competition.
However, in the interim, and as part of a bid to enhance its
program of regional integration, ECOWAS has adopted a regional
competition framework that improves the regulatory environment
and preserves sufficient policy space for governments to pursue
suitable development objectives.
The ECOWAS Supplementary Act covers the traditional areas
reflected in the antitrust laws of the US and the competition policy
of the EU, including agreements and concerted practices in
Id.
Id. art. 13(1).
222 Id. art. 11(1)(iii). However, to qualify for exemption, the measures must
not allow consumers a “fair share of the resulting benefit,” and not “ impose on
the concerned enterprises, restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives;” or “afford such enterprises the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question.” Id. art. 11(1)(iii).
223 Id. art. 11(2).
224 Id. art. 11(3).
225 Id. art. 10(1).
220
221
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restraint of trade, 226 abuse of dominant position 227 and mergers and
acquisitions. 228 However, unlike those regulatory frameworks, the
ECOWAS Supplementary Act contains additional provisions on
state aid 229 and public enterprises 230 which are couched in flexible
language that preserves sufficient policy space for West African
governments to pursue developmental policies that may require
the grant of special preferences to individuals and groups. Thus,
state aid of a social character given without discrimination as to
origin of products, or for development in economically depressed
areas or for other priority regional economic projects, would be
considered compatible with the Supplementary Act. 231
Furthermore, the provisions on public enterprises exempt such
enterprises from the application of competition rules where such
application would “obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of
the particular tasks assigned to them.” 232 In effect, enforcement of
ECOWAS competition rules can be relaxed where they would
interfere with the performance of the public enterprises.
Moreover, the Regional Competition is empowered to exempt
certain anti-competitive acts that are desirable 233 or considered to
be in the public interest. 234
Significantly, the Supplementary Act does not mention the
principles of national treatment, most-favored nation treatment,
transparency or fairness of procedures. The omission is a stark
rejection of the arguments that were made to support
incorporating the WTO core principles into a binding multilateral
competition policy. 235 The Supplementary Act permits the
governments of ECOWAS countries to craft economic policies that
aim at specific developmental objectives including creating an
optimum as opposed to a maximum level of competition; 236
regulating the behavior of multinational corporations; supporting
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236

Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 8
Id. art. 9.
Id. arts. 8(2), (3).
Id. art. 9(2).
Id. art. 11(1)(iii).
Id. art. 11(2).
Infra notes 73–93 and accompanying text.
EU EPAs, supra note 117, at 30.
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national firms or sectors by reserving the right to discriminate
against foreign economic operators; or resisting demands to
prohibit or privatize state monopolies or deregulate and liberalize
sectors considered strategic from a developmental perspective such
as education, energy, health, transportation, or finance. 237
As of the time of writing, West Africa and the EU are reported
to have agreed on the text of a partial EPA agreement covering
goods only, after compromises were found on a number of
outstanding critical issues, such as degree of market opening by
West Africa, development assistance, most favored nation
treatment for European goods, rules of origin and EU agricultural
subsidies. 238 During the negotiations, the EU proposed a specific
rendez-vous clause that envisaged future negotiations sometime
after the adoption of the partial EPA on the content of binding
commitments on competition policy. However, West Africa
rejected the EU proposal, and countered with a far more general
provision that would simply require the parties to reconvene after
the adoption of the partial EPA to discuss whether to pursue
negotiations in additional areas, including competition and if so, to
determine at such future time the scope and modalities for the
negotiations.
Given that the areas covered by the ECOWAS Supplementary
Act are quite comprehensive and adequately cover the wellestablished competition rules recognized in most of the
jurisdictions in the world including the US and the EU, it does not
appear that there are any benefits to be gained by holding
237

The following examples are quite instructive.

For instance, a case where two large domestic companies are allowed to
merge so that they reach economies of scale to compete with other firms
at the regional or international level, whereas the same merge involving
one domestic firm and a multinational firm may need to be prohibited to
avoid a concentration of market power. An additional example is where
a government seeks to promote small and medium enterprises through
specific benefits and defines an eligibility criteria based on sales or profit
thresholds that de facto exclude foreign firms (although de juris such
firms were not facially excluded on the basis of nationality). Finally,
another example concerns the promotion of export activity, where, by
definition, only domestic firms may be targeted, since foreign
competitors are already international.
Id. at 31 (internal quotations omitted) (footnote omitted).
238
EPA: West Africa and the EU Conclude a Deal, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE &
SUSTAINABLE
DEV.
(ICTSD)
(Feb.
6,
2014),
available
at
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/epa-west-africa-andthe-eu-conclude-a-deal.
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negotiations on competition policy in the context of the EPA. It
may therefore not be useful for West Africa to pursue discussions
on matters that go beyond the areas of cooperation in respect of
competition policy already identified in the Draft Joint EPA.
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